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[Forthcoming chapter in SOVEREIGN DEBT: FROM SAFETY TO DEFAULT (Robert W. Kolb, ed. 2010-11)]

Facing the Debt Challenge of Countries That Are “Too Big To Fail”
Steven L. Schwarcz 1

The recent financial woes of Greece and other nations have reinvigorated the
debate over whether to bail out defaulting countries or, instead, restructure their debt.
Bailouts are expensive, in the case of Greece costing potentially hundreds of billions of
euros. Although the European Union and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are
underwriting the Greek bailout, the IMF’s payment is funded by all IMF member
nations—the U.S., for example, provides 17% of IMF funding—so we all share in the
burden. 2

In the case of Greece, a bailout was virtually inevitable because a default on
Greek debt was believed to have the potential to bring down the world financial system,
whereas an orderly debt restructuring was impractical. This is a growing problem. As
global capital markets increasingly (and inevitably) embrace sovereign bonds, the
potential for a country’s debt default to trigger a larger systemic collapse becomes even
more tightly linked.

1
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Business, Duke University School of Law, and author of Sovereign Debt Restructuring:
A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 956, and Systemic
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Nor are IMF payments made to bail out sovereign countries necessarily profitable
investments for the member nations. Member nations earn interest on their deposits in the
IMF, but repayment by the IMF, although anticipated, is not assured. Furthermore, the
IMF pays member nations less than a market rate of interest on their deposits. Steven L.
Schwarcz, ‘Idiot’s Guide’ to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1189, 119596 (2004).
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Too Big To Fail
This reveals a phenomenon viewed until recently as limited to large banks—the
problem of “too big to fail.” A bank whose default could trigger an economic domino
effect is, or at least may be perceived to be, too big to fail. It therefore must be bailed out
by public funds. This can foster moral hazard: anticipating a bail-out, the bank may lack
incentive to take a prudent economic course. 3

Countries, even those as small as Greece, can likewise be seen as too big to fail if
their default could trigger wider economic collapse. That too can foster moral hazard.
The Greek government, for example, did little to impose fiscal austerity even as debts
accumulated.

An Alternative to Bailouts
Bailouts are not, however, the only way to prevent defaults. Just as policymakers
have been proposing orderly resolution procedures for troubled banks and other large
financial institutions, an orderly resolution procedure for troubled countries can bypass
the need for a bailout.

Countries are very different than banks, of course. Nonetheless, there are
meaningful ways to create debt resolution procedures for troubled nations. Perhaps the
most notable is the concept of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM),
originally proposed by scholars (including the author) and later refined by the IMF into a
template for an international convention. The template was never adopted as a treaty,
however, because of political opposition in the United States by the second Bush
Administration. Although the basis of the Administration’s opposition was not clearly
articulated, it appeared to reflect the philosophical dogma that free-market solutions
always ought to trump legislative ones.

The Holdout Problem and the Funding Problem
3

Moral hazard more generally refers to the tendency of people who are protected from
the consequences of risky behavior to engage in such behavior.
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In the sovereign debt restructuring realm, however, free-market solutions are
inadequate because of market failures—of which the two most important are the holdout
problem and the funding problem. The holdout problem is that any given creditor has an
incentive to strategically hold out from agreeing to a reasonable debt-restructuring plan,
hoping that the imperative of others to settle will persuade them to allocate the holdout
more than its fair share of the settlement or purchase the holdout’s claim. 4 The funding
problem is that a country is likely to need to borrow new money to pay critical expenses
during the debt restructuring process but no lender is likely to be willing to lend such
funds unless its right to repayment has priority over existing debt claims. Any effective
SDRM would at least have to address these two problems.

Addressing the Holdout Problem
The holdout problem can be addressed by legislating, through international treaty,
a form of “super-majority” voting on sovereign debt-restructuring plans, in which the
vote by the overwhelming majority of similarly situated creditors can bind dissenting
creditors. This is the tried-and-true method by which insolvency law, including Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States, successfully and equitably addresses the
holdout problem in a corporate context and achieves consensual debt restructuring.
Because only similarly situated creditors can vote to bind dissenting creditors, and
because any outcome of voting will bind all those creditors alike, the outcomes of votes
should benefit the claims of holdouts and dissenters as much as the claims of the supermajority. 5

Many have argued, nonetheless, that the holdout problem can be addressed
contractually through what are referred to as collective-action clauses (CACs), allowing
essential payment terms of a loan facility to be changed through super-majority, as
opposed to unanimous, voting. 6 There are, however, two fundamental problems with
4

‘Idiot’s Guide,’ supra note 2, at 1193.
Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization
Approach, 85 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 956, 1006 (2000).
6
See, e.g., BARRY EICHENGREEN, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
ARCHITECTURE 65-70 (1999); Christopher Greenwood & Hugh Mercer, Considerations
5

Kolb sovereign debt book - Countries 'Too Big to Fail'.doc

4
CACs. First, CACs are not always included in sovereign loan and bond agreements. In
the Greek debt crisis, for example, 90 percent of the total debt was not governed by
CACs. 7 Although creditors could consider agreeing during a crisis to include those
clauses in their agreements, the likelihood of achieving that is small. 8

Secondly, even if every sovereign loan and bond agreement included CACs, such
clauses would work on an agreement-by-agreement basis. Therefore, any one or more
syndicate of banks or group of bondholders that fails to achieve a super-majority vote
would itself be a holdout vis-à-vis other creditors. It therefore is unlikely that CACs can
ever effectively resolve the holdout problem in sovereign-debt restructuring. 9

It also is unlikely that the holdout problem will be addressed judicially. To the
contrary, some courts have encouraged holdout behavior. In Allied Bank Int’l v. Banco
Credito Agricola de Cartago, 10 for example, the court upheld a holdout-creditor’s claim.
A member of a bank syndicate that refused to join a restructuring agreement between
Costa Rican sovereign debtors and other syndicate members sued in the United States for
repayment of its defaulted loan. 11 The court granted summary judgment in favor of the
holdout bank on the basis that the loan was clearly due and payable, notwithstanding
Costa Rica’s unilateral regulation suspending its external debt payments. 12 Similarly, in
Elliott Assocs. v. Banco de la Nacion, 13 the holdout was a vulture fund (one that invests
in distressed debt) that had bought debt of two government-guaranteed Peruvian banks at
a deep discount. The Fund then received, but refused to participate in, an offer to
of International Law, in BARRY EICHENGREEN & RICHARD PORTES, CRISIS? WHAT
CRISIS? ORDERLY WORKOUTS FOR SOVEREIGN DEBTORS (1995), at 110; [•cite to Gulati
also].
7
Lee Buchheit & Mitu Gulati, Buchheit & Gulati on How To Restructure Greek Debt,
THE FACULTY LOUNGE (blog), May 9, 2010 (last visited May 13, 2010).
8
“Idiot’s Guide,’ supra note 2, at 1203.
9
See Hal S. Scott, A Bankruptcy Procedure for Sovereign Debt, 37 INT’L LAW. 103, 129
(2003) (concluding that “[t]he insertion of collective action clauses in sovereign bonds is
an exercise in futility”).
10
757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985).
11
Id. at 519.
12
Id. at 522-23.
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exchange that debt for new bonds, instead suing Peru for payment. The Fund was granted
judgment on appeal, but the parties ultimately settled. 14

Addressing the Funding Problem
For these reasons, I believe that an international convention, in which supermajority voting can bind all of a nation’s creditors, is needed to solve the holdout
problem. Such a convention also could address the funding problem by granting a first
priority right of repayment to loans of new money made to enable a country to pay
critical expenses during the debt restructuring process. Existing creditors can be protected
by giving them the right to object to a new-money loan if its amount is too high or its
terms are inappropriate. Existing creditors will also be further protected because a
country that abuses new-money lending privileges will be unlikely to receive supermajority creditor approval for a debt-restructuring plan.

Consensus and Disputes
Once these two market failures have been addressed, the remainder of the
sovereign debt restructuring process can be consensual. A consensual process would not
undermine the rule of law, as would an attempt by a nation to impose a “haircut” on its
bonds such as by unilaterally reducing the principal amount of the bonds or the rate of
interest payable thereunder. Nor should a consensual restructuring increase borrowing
costs for other nations. Indeed, a nation whose debt has been consensually restructured
should itself be able to borrow new money at attractive rates. In the non-sovereign
context, by analogy, lending rates to companies with consensually restructured debt are
much lower than rates charged before the restructuring. Admittedly, the lower rates in
part reflect that companies, after restructuring their debt, have a more conservative capital
structure. After a consensual debt restructuring, however, new-money lenders are less
likely to charge a risk premium reflecting uncertainty as to whether the debtor will again
try to unilaterally reduce its debt.

13
14

194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999).
‘Idiot’s Guide,’ supra note 2, at 1193 n. 14.
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Nor would a sovereign debt restructuring process need to depend on the creation
of a “bankruptcy” court or other costly institutional arbiter. Indeed, the experience of
corporate debt restructuring in the United States under Chapter 11 confirms that the
parties themselves do most of the negotiating. 15 There may nonetheless be circumstances
when parties have disputes. I have suggested that a relatively low-cost and
straightforward procedure already exists under international law for this purpose. 16 The
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an autonomous body
created under the auspices of the World Bank, provides facilities for arbitration of
investment disputes. 17 The ICSID arbitration procedure is well established, commonly
used, and widely accepted, and it should be a useful model to the extent that a tribunal is
needed to resolve sovereign debt restructuring disputes. 18 Others have similarly proposed
creation of an international arbitral panel for this purpose. 19

Conclusion
As finance becomes more intertwined, sovereign debt defaults will become even
more likely to trigger larger systemic collapses. That, in turn, will make most nations too
big to fail. Without an effective sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, defaulting
nations will expect to—and in most cases, by necessity, almost certainly will—be bailed

15

James B. Hurlock, The Way Ahead for Sovereign Debt, INT’L FIN. L. REV., July 1995,
at 12 (“most U.S. bankruptcies are self-executing in that creditors, in concert with the
debtor, collectively determine the economic terms upon which the enterprise will be
restructured.”); DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 10-2, at 734 (1993) (“It would
be wrong to think of the Chapter 11 process as primarily a litigated, judged-ruled
adversarial process. Plans proposed and adopted in Chapter 11 almost always have been
produced by negotiation, not by litigation.”).
16
‘Idiot’s Guide,’ supra note 2, at 1210.
17
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, art. 1, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S.
159. The ICSID Convention applies to disputes between contracting countries and
nationals of other contracting countries, but I suggest it as a model for a parallel
sovereign debt dispute adjudication procedure.
18
See ‘Idiot’s Guide,’ supra note 2, at 1210-1211.
19
Christoph G. Paulus & Steven T. Kargman, “Reforming the Process of Sovereign Debt
Restructuring: A Proposal for a Sovereign Debt Tribunal,” Apr. 7, 2008 unpublished
draft.
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out by the international community. We then will all end up subsidizing nations that lack
the political will or ability to be fiscally responsible.
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